

BOOK REVIEWS

Aristotle, *On the Life-Bearing Spirit (De Spiritu). A Discussion with Plato and his Predecessors on Pneuma as the Instrumental Body of the Soul*. Introduction, Translation and Commentary by Abraham P. Bos and Rein Ferwerda, Leiden/Boston 2008: Brill. 209 pages. ISBN: 9789004164581

The word ‘spirit’, just like the Greek word ‘*pneuma*’, meant originally something like ‘breath’ or ‘wind’. In the course of time the meaning of these words has shifted to indicate the ‘inner person’. Think, for example, of the apostle Paul’s first letter to the Corinthians, where he asks in the second chapter: “For who among men knows the thoughts of a man except the spirit of the man which is in him?” (v. 11). This latter meaning of inwardness was probably right from the beginning present in the word, since ‘spiritus’ or ‘pneuma’ as breath or wind must have been steeped in mystery of living being for ancient humanity. In the course of time the original, primary meaning of breath receded to the background.

In the work *De spiritu* a significant shift in the meaning of the word becomes apparent. However, strangely enough this work has never received the attention which it deserves. It belongs to the *corpus Aristotelicum*, but there is an almost unanimous consensus that this work, so badly conceived and written and, apparently, not at all congruous with the rest of the great philosopher’s work, cannot have been written by him. In the oldest list of the works of the Peripatetic it is not found and since the sixteenth century its authenticity was doubted. At the beginning of the twentieth century the great scholar Werner Jaeger’s judgment that this work cannot possibly have been written by Aristotle found favour in the eyes of almost every scholar.

The editors of this new study on *De spiritu* make clear even in the title, but also in the lucid introduction and extensive commentary of this work that this almost universal judgment is misguided. This work may have the character of a rough draft and the manuscript may show many lacunas, but it unmistakably betrays the hand of the master. The reason for this massive judgment against its authenticity is, according to the authors, due to a wrong interpretation of Peripatetic philosophy which reaches all the way back to Alexander of Aphrodisias who around the year 200 introduced the common interpretation of Aristotle’s conception of the soul as the form and the body as the matter which together guarantee the unity of every living creature.

Of course, a scholar like Werner Jaeger was well aware of passages in the *corpus*, especially of the still existing parts of the lost dialogues, which cannot be harmonized with this hylomorphism. Hence, he introduced the notion of a development in the thought of the great philosopher. During the time that Aristotle was a disciple of Plato, he shared more or less the dualistic views of his master, but after leaving the Academy he developed via a transitory stage his own, scientific conception. However, this interpretation still leaves a number of problems unsolved. Aristotle was an astute biologist and his observations on

that terrain could not easily be synchronized with a simple hylomorphism. How can one explain the birth and growth of living beings in terms of the model of form and matter? In his biological works, which, everyone agrees, belong to his later writings, mention the role of *pneuma* as intermediary between body and soul. What is precisely the role of this '*pneuma*'? A simple hylomorphism does not require anything like an intermediary. Questions such as these have led one of the editors of this book, Abraham P. Bos, to have developed another interpretation of Aristotle's view of living creatures which he has worked out in his book, *The Soul and its Instrumental Body. A Reinterpretation of Aristotle's Philosophy of Living Nature* (Leiden: Brill, 2003).

Undoubtedly this new interpretation gave rise to the need to have another critical look at *De spiritu*. Is there still sufficient reason to deny Aristotle the authorship of this work? How solid are the grounds for rejecting it? Are there perhaps good reasons to argue that *De spiritu* can be accounted for as an authentic work of the Peripatetic? Are there arguments to demonstrate that the question which it addresses fits in with the whole of his philosophy? That question reads: "The innate *pneuma*, how does it maintain itself and grow?"

One may rightly suspect that the editors base their defence for the authenticity of this work largely on the wholly new interpretation of the work of Aristotle to which they adhere. If, however, this suspicion becomes a reproach that the editors offer in fact a biased account, the knife of such a critique cuts both ways. Does not the exclusion of this work betray the fact that scholars of Aristotle have for many years suffered a rather severe case of tunnel vision in their study of Aristotle?

However, after studying this book diligently, the reader will be convinced that this criticism is simply unfair. The editors have made a very thorough study of the document; they have carefully reviewed all the arguments that have been proposed either for or against the authenticity of Aristotle's authorship. Their diligence has not withheld them from taking a clear position: it is Aristotle himself who wrote it, because it harmonizes very well with what he has written in his biological works.

The question which the work deals with makes clear that *pneuma* is, according to Aristotle, corporeal, for only bodies need to maintain themselves and grow. In this sense *pneuma* must be distinguished from *psyche* (the soul), for the latter is incorporeal. The answer to this question we can summarize in the words of the editors: "What he achieves in any case in this work is to demonstrate convincingly that respiration cannot be the fundamental principle of life and that this role should be awarded to the innate heat" (Introduction p. 24). Considering the original meaning of *pneuma* this is a rather surprising conclusion. Here we have a significant shift in meaning. Aristotle gives two reasons why respiration cannot be regarded as the fundamental principle of living beings. Firstly, living beings already 'live' before they breathe, in the sense that the seed from which they came to be was already alive. Thus, life begins before there is respiration. Secondly, there are all kinds of living beings which do not breathe, such as fish, according to Aristotle.

The answer to this question is rather negative, as the editors also recognize. The focus of Aristotle is mainly to dispute the position of his opponents rather than to propagate his own solution. However, who are these opponents? One name is mentioned in *De spiritu*: Aristogenes. There was one or more Aristogenes, one of whom wrote books in the area of medicine, but he lived after Aristotle. If indeed this Aristogenes was the opponent then, of course, the conclusion must be that *De spiritu* cannot have been written by Aristotle. The editors argue, however, that it is quite clear who defended the position which the author rejects: namely, Plato and his predecessors. The editors therefore argue that the name Aristogenes must understood as a 'literary joke' for Plato, for Plato's father was named 'Ariston' and Aristogenes can be taken to mean something like: Ariston's offspring.

It is certain that this work will not put an end to the discussion of Aristotle's authorship of *De spiritu*, but its value lies in challenging anyone who is not convinced to come with newer, stronger arguments.

G. Groenewoud

Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski, *The Philosophy of Religion: An Historical Introduction (Fundamentals of Philosophy)* 2007: Wiley-Blackwell. Paperback. 264 pages. ISBN: 1405118725 / 978-1405118729.

Reading Linda Zagzebski's *Philosophy of Religion* is like sitting in on one of her courses at Oklahoma University hearing her teach a subject she obviously loves. Her colloquial style and original examples make the book accessible and inviting. Contrary to what dreams the subtitle, *A Historical Introduction*, may evoke in the mind of the fresh reader, her book is not a chronological overview of the philosophy of religion. The book is structured topically and is 'historical' only in the sense of including ancient, medieval as well as modern sources. Also, the book is not just an introduction, rather than plainly listing and explaining the topics, Zagzebski generously shares her own thoughts and doubts, encouraging the readers to follow her example.

In the introductory chapter Zagzebski makes some loose comments on religion, philosophy and their joining up. Then, Zagzebski starts at the classical place to start philosophy of religion in the West, with a discussion of the arguments for the existence of God. She treats the cosmological, teleological and ontological argument clearly and at the end of the chapter tries to interweave them into one argument. Interesting is her information on the change in use of the arguments over time. She cites M. Buckley S.J., who holds that when in the seventeenth century the arguments, that originally functioned to reconfirm already held beliefs, were used to convince non-believers of the existence of God, this served as an incentive for intellectuals to become atheists. Thus, the modern attempt to philosophically found belief in God served as a cause for atheism to arise rather than being the response to atheism that it later grew to be (p.28–9).

What happened in Western thought, then, when these arguments failed to provide the firm ground, the existence of God, that would justify all beliefs that were seen to be built on top of this? That would thus justify religion altogether? One other possible answer than to become an atheist was to say that faith did not need such an outside foundation. Faith justifies itself, fideism said. Zagzebski discusses three varieties of this answer. She summarizes Pascals wager and Kierkegaards stages and then explains Wittgensteins later view of religious beliefs. She praises Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein for pointing out that a belief and a person believing cannot be separated — she learns from them that ‘the proposition that *God Exist* is like an object lying around waiting for somebody to pick it up ... what it means depends upon who the person is who believes it’. And, more radically, for Wittgenstein there was never a proposition to be picked up, before it was understood (p.76).

The next chapter turns to the question *Who or What Is God?* Zagzebski explains how Christian thinkers have thought about God. She explains the *via negativa* as well as some famous puzzles about traditional Christian attributes of God: timelessness, perfect goodness, omnipotence and omniscience. Also she expounds on divine personhood and trinity. This is a chapter in which she does a lot of thinking out loud, and also uses some classical examples such as ‘*Can God create a Stone he cannot lift himself?*’ for omnipotence.

The following chapter deals with another philosophical puzzle, one usually not so extensively dealt with, that of theological fatalism. If God knows all, it would seem that all is predestined, because in God’s knowledge it is already known what I will do, so, freedom seems impossible. Zagzebski gives three traditional Christian solutions to this problem. Cut very short: Boethius solution, that Aquinas later used, was that God’s knowledge is a-temporal. Thus, within time one can still be free. Ockham, followed by Plantinga, defended that while God in his infallible foreknowledge could at T1 have believed we would do something, such as mow our lawn, at T2, when we decide to let the grass take care of itself, it changes Gods foreknowledge at T1. Plantinga thinks the gardener has ‘counterfactual power over the past’ which somehow is different from the power to change the past. De Molina tried to solve the puzzle by connecting God’s knowledge to God’s creative will: God knows all choices that can be made in all circumstances under the laws of nature, and uses this knowledge for deciding what to create.

The next chapter introduces religion as providing a possible goal, aim, motivation and metaphysical ground to morality. The chapter disturbingly ends up in the conclusion that ‘people can accept a common code of behavior without agreeing on the metaphysical ground of value and the source of authority of morality, nor need they agree on the ultimate aim of human life, nor need they have the same motives to be moral’ (p.141). A discussion of the meaning of the commonality against the background of such deep difference misses in this chapter.

Next follows a clear chapter on some classical Christian dealings with the problem of evil. Interestingly, Epicurus in the third century BC already formulated the problem that is still discussed: how can evil exist in a world with a God

who is both perfectly good and omnipotent. Zagzebski treats J.L. Mackie's 1955 paper that disqualifies four traditional solutions, including the free will defense. Then she explains how A. Plantinga deals with moral evil by distinguishing between Gods *weakly* respectively *strongly* actualizing acts. Also, she addresses J. Hick's soul-making theodicy, a modification of the Free Will defense including the idea that it is not just for the sake of freely choosing a relation with God that evil exists, but also for the soul to be able to grow to a shape in which that is possible. This relationship with God, and not freedom itself, outweighs evil. But situations where evil actually seem to crumble people's souls remain a mystery (p.165). Zagzebski considers the chance that we cannot understand God's reasons to permit evil so probable, that for her evil altogether can never be a valid argument against the existence of God (p.163).

Her chapter on death and the afterlife discusses the conditions of afterlife being *my* afterlife. Is the frog turned into a prince still the prince he was before he became the frog? Zagzebski defends that evil can only be justified if there is an afterlife indeed. After one of the most authentic passages of her book she ends with a quote from Tolstoy's story *The death of Ivan Ilych*: "And death ... where is it?" He sought his former accustomed fear of death and did not find it. 'Where is it? What death?' There was no fear because there was no death. In place of death there was light' (p.188–9).

Zagzebski then turns to what she calls 'the problem of religious diversity'. She initially relates this problem to whether or not someone else believing something else threatens me in my faith. After giving a standard explanation of inclusivist, exclusivist and a pluralist position, she explains her own view of the matter. Zagzebski presupposes that a person only feels threatened in one's belief when one truly admires the other that one could otherwise simply ignore. Fortunately, this admiration is also a basis for tolerance in a religiously plural society (p.210). The space to appreciate the others qualities arises with the recognition, that just like oneself relies on one's own emotions and beliefs to be true, the other also has a such a self-trust. Also one can be aware that, had one lived the life of the other, one's own belief might have very much resembled that of the other

In the closing chapter Zagzebski discusses once again the relation between faith and reason. She thinks it is a moral duty to thoroughly investigate one's beliefs. A moral duty with benefits, for this critical self-reflection on beliefs and accompanying or underlying emotions brings depth to aspects of the self, in the end integrating it (p.232). For her, philosophy as an academic field ideally also undertakes this action of self-scrutiny (p.234).

Zagzebski teaches the reader a valuable kind of reasoning about religion that has taken place and continues in western philosophical and Christian theological traditions. Impressive is the area she covers in her book, from ancients, to medieval, to modern examples. Still, for western philosophy of religion to really achieve Zagzebski's intended aim of most critical self-reflection it also needs reflection on 'the other'. This is also necessary for philosophy of religion to truly understand religion, and not just Christianity or monotheism. The topics Zagzebski treats, the existence of transcendence, the character of belief,

the nature of God, freedom, morality, evil, death, have without exception also been dealt with in the Buddhist, Taoist, Hindu and Confucian traditions. Fortunately, these traditions not only have their own histories of philosophizing, they have of late also become part of the world wide history of philosophy of religion. Attention to their views and developments would broaden philosophy of religion from a focus on the epistemological question how beliefs can or cannot be justified or combined in line with demands of western rationality, to the hermeneutical and existential question in what sense religious insights that differ so deeply express truth about who we are and why we are here.

A. Vroom

Jonathan L. Kvanvig (ed.), *Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, Volume I*. Oxford 2008: Oxford University Press. viii + 272 pages. ISBN 9780199542666.

There can be little doubt that this is an excellent collection of 11 original papers covering a broad spectrum of debates and issues in contemporary Anglo-American analytic philosophy of religion. Contributors include Alicia Finch, John Martin Fischer, Bryan Frances, Alan Hájek, Robert Koons, Tomothy O'Connor, Alexander Pruss, Michael Rea, Thomas Senior, Eleonore Stump, Peter van Inwagen, and Linda Zagzebski. This volume is a fine start of what looks to be a promising new series of *Oxford Studies*. New volumes are expected to appear every one to two years, under the editorship of Jonathan Kvanvig (Baylor University). Discussing all the essays is impossible within the confines of this brief review, so I will limit myself to just a few. My selection of essays may reveal more about my personal preferences than about their objective qualities.

The essays by Finch & Rea, Fischer, and Van Inwagen are directly or indirectly concerned with the compatibility of divine omniscience (or foreknowledge) and human freedom. Finch & Rea discuss one important reply to fatalist arguments for the impossibility of free action, to wit Ockham's way out. Roughly, Ockham's way out is to draw a distinction between 'hard' and 'soft' facts about the past. A hard fact about the past is entirely about the past, whereas a soft fact about the past somehow includes things that take place at later times. That God knew in 1977 that Jeroen de Ridder would write this review in 2009 would qualify as a soft fact on this view. If this distinction holds water, it allows one to say that present agents can have a choice about soft facts about the past and this move blocks the inference from divine foreknowledge to impossibility of free action. Finch & Rea argue that Ockham's way out is only available to someone who accepts eternalism — i.e., the view that past, present, and future objects all exist — and not to a presentist — i.e., someone who believes only present objects exist. A rough summary of their argument goes as follows. A presentist holds that only presently existing entities really exist. Facts about presently existing entities obviously depend ontologically on the existence of these entities. But if it was a fact in 1977 that I would write this review

in 2009, then this fact cannot depend in any way on my existence, since — according to the presentist — I did not exist at that time. If that is true, however, then there is and was no way for me to have a choice about aforementioned fact and hence I do not act freely in writing this review.

This certainly is an intriguing argument, but I wonder whether it is wholly persuasive. Perhaps more tinkering is possible with the precise distinction between hard and soft facts. Another possible reply might be to accept most of what Finch & Rea say, but resist the conclusion that this makes trouble for the presentist Ockhamist. Although the entity involved in the fact that I write this review in 2009 — that is, *I* — didn't exist in 1977, it does exist now and that is exactly how it should be. Past facts that involve entities or events in the future are what they are because of how the future turns out to be. So even if it is a fact *in 1977* that I would write this review in 2009, that fact depends ontologically on my then future existence and *now* writing the review. The presentist would then have to provide an account of how there can be a (soft) fact about me in 1977 without me being in existence at that time. Maybe soft facts are somehow stretched out over time. Clearly this needs a lot more work, but perhaps it can be done.

In a provocative essay, Bryan Frances argues that there is something epistemically wrong with the theistic beliefs of typical theistic philosophers. Atheism is a real live option in the philosophical community. One that is in fact believed by many very knowledgeable philosophers. Because of this, says Frances, a theistic philosopher needs significant support for her theistic beliefs. Given that most theistic philosophers have not had spectacular ('zappy') spiritual experiences which produce huge quantities of support for their beliefs, they have to get this support from other sources, in particular more calm spiritual experiences. Frances's argument then is that although these modest spiritual experiences — while capable of producing some initial support — are incapable of significantly supporting theistic beliefs because of the testimony of spiritual experts who say that such experiences, although useful as first steps on the way to authentic spiritual experiences, aren't genuine experiences of God and hence cannot properly support theistic belief.

Although the argument is presented carefully and has quite a bit of appeal, I believe the theistic philosopher has resources to resist its conclusion. First, in setting up the argument, Frances assumes without much argument that there is an asymmetry in the need for evidential support between atheism and theism (p. 52), with theism of course getting the wrong end of the stick. The theist may well question that assumption. Furthermore, it's an open question — subject of a lively debate in current epistemology — in what circumstances if any the presence of disagreeing epistemic equals requires you to muster additional support for your beliefs to continue to be in good epistemic standing. Finally, it's not entirely clear to me how one would identify the spiritual experts Frances introduces and whether there really are such experts who testify as he claims.

Alan Hájek offers a reconstruction and evaluation of Hume's famous argument against the possibility of justified belief in miracles and defends it against implausible exegeses by Anthony Flew and Dorothy Coleman. His conclusion,

to which I'm sympathetic, is that Hume's argument will be compelling only for those who already deem the prior probabilities of divine interventions low, which is not something a theist is likely to do. Hájek also points out how Hume's reasoning against justified belief in miracles interestingly undermines his own problem of induction. If it is never rational to believe that something very disanalogous to our previous experience, i.e., something miraculous, has happened, then surely believing that the sun may fail to rise tomorrow is also irrational and hence we have at least an epistemological solution to the problem of induction.

Eleonore Stump makes the case that an adequate solution to the problem of evil should also include an account of why God allows humans to suffer from unfulfilled and frustrated 'desires of the heart', i.e., longings that are deeply significant for a person without being absolutely essential to human flourishing in general. For example, in the biblical story of Job, there would have to be a justification for why God allows Job's children to be killed by diabolically induced disasters even if it is true that Job's suffering is necessary to his purification and even if his purification is, all things considered, a greater good than the suffering required for it.

Stump offers a compelling argument that a rigorously stern-minded attitude, which denies the legitimacy of any desires of the heart beyond a desire for human flourishing in general (which, on a Christian understanding, will include the love of God and one's neighbour), is to be rejected. What I felt to be missing from her arguments though, was a more refined account of *which* desires of the heart are such that their frustration needs redemption. Surely, the evil, banal, or trivial desires of the heart that people often have do not belong in this category. Presumably, however, her forthcoming *Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and the Problem of Suffering* (Oxford UP) will address these and other worries in more detail.

The essays by Tom Senior and Tim O'Connor scrutinize the argument of William Rowe's recent book *Can God Be Free?* (Oxford UP, 2004) and find various faults in Rowe's reasoning that God cannot be significantly free in creating because he is bound to create the best possible world.

The final essay I want to mention is Linda Zagzebski's. She creatively explores the idea that God is 'omnisubjective', which means that He is able to grasp the first-person perspective of every conscious being. She argues that this feature is a consequence of God's cognitive perfection. A cognitively perfect being would have to know everything there is to know and that includes 'what it is like' to experience a given colour as one person and as another and the differences between these two experiences. It also includes knowledge of the difference between the first- and third-person perspectives on a state of affairs. The pull of this argument will depend on what you think of the significance of the first-person perspective and whether it really offers additional knowledge over and above the third-person perspective, but the idea of omnisubjectivity certainly is intriguing and worth more attention.

I'll end with a brief conclusion: Anyone who wants to get or stay up to speed in analytic philosophy of religion will do well to obtain a copy of this volume of *Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion* and to keep an eye out for upcoming ones.

J. de Ridder

Lambert Zuidervaart, *Social Philosophy after Adorno* Cambridge 2007: Cambridge University Press. 219 pages. ISBN 9780521690386

*Social Philosophy after Adorno* is a book rich in philosophical argument and, while not always explicitly present, draws on a number of reformational insights in finding a path through the maze of Adorno's thought and the many criticisms his work has evoked. This review will only be able to scratch at the surface of Zuidervaart's fine contribution to the role philosophy can have in the search for meaningful social transformation.

Zuidervaart starts, in the first chapter, with a critique of Christoph Menke's deconstructive reading of Adorno's notion of aesthetic autonomy. Menke reads the autonomy of aesthetic experience, in its distinction from the non-aesthetic, as holding an essentially negative and disruptive relation to everything that is not art. It is in this negative relation, derived from the lack of conventions or rules peculiar to aesthetic experience, that gives art its normative force. Zuidervaart's critique finds in Menke a double reduction; first of "artistic autonomy to aesthetic autonomy," and then of "aesthetic autonomy to the supposed negativity of aesthetic experience" (p.25). Here Zuidervaart follows his mentor Calvin Seerveld in affirming that "the arts are multidimensional, as are the modes in which they are experienced" (p.26). This is in contrast to Menke's "nomological and reductive" account which requires him to "set aside the ways in which the arts participate in political, economic, moral, religious, and even scientific processes ... [and] ignore the ways in which the experiencing of art normally and properly includes nonaesthetic concerns" (p.26). Menke's second reduction of aesthetic autonomy to the "supposed negativity of aesthetic experience" (p.26) means that its normativity becomes derivative because based on its subversion of nonaesthetic norms and reductive because it "must ignore the degree to which aesthetic experience is itself constituted by its sociohistorical structuration" and "the internal complexity of the aesthetic dimension" (p.27).

Zuidervaart then turns to the question of a post-metaphysical philosophy as elaborated by Albrecht Wellmer. He finds Wellmer's approach to be too narrowed by his focus on the epistemological problems of truth, causing him to miss the materialist character of Adorno for whom metaphysical questions have a sociohistorical character (pp.52 & 54). Further Zuidervaart is concerned to hold on to the metaphysical element of Adorno which emphasizes the twin themes of suffering and hope. These themes require philosophy to ask "what transformations in society and philosophy would be both possible and required in order for needless suffering to end." (p.53). Zuidervaart seeks to show that a

postmetaphysical philosophy, in refusing all transcendence, is in danger of abandoning “the project of a comprehensive critique of society” (p.60). For such a critique to be possible philosophy must let suffering speak and hold open the hope for a future without suffering. Nevertheless there are elements of Adorno’s account that Zuidervaart finds problematic. These coalesce in the themes of the “privilege of experience” (pp.66–69) and the “objectification of hope” (pp.70–76). It is in the context of the latter where he develops his critique that Adorno fails to sufficiently distinguish between “societal evil and the violation of societal principles” (p.72). Adorno comes down so hard on the former, in Zuidervaart’s view, that a total critique is made both necessary and, at the same time, impossible. Zuidervaart does not want to lighten the critique at all but make it more radical through an insistence that “the transformation of society’s entire architecture” should not be pitted against “transformations within that architecture” (p.72). This then gets a rather Kuyperian formulation in terms of the need to penetrate “to the multiple roots of change that together could generate the architectonic transformation” that Adorno longs for. The reason that Adorno does not see this is, according to Zuidervaart, “because he does not articulate distinct societal principles and does not explicate their specific violations” (p.75). He is left with, what Zuidervaart aptly calls, a totalizing of transformation.

Chapter Three explores the “dialectical extremes” of Heidegger and Adorno in their respective conceptions of truth. Zuidervaart is in sympathy with both Heidegger and Adorno in their shared view that truth is a “comprehensive idea that cannot be reduced to notions of propositional correctness or empirical accuracy” (p.77). The dialectic comes in their respective approaches to the “authentication of truth” and here Zuidervaart finds each to lose sight, in their own way, of the necessarily public and contestable character of the authentication of truth. He concludes his analysis of the two philosophers by arguing that “just as Heidegger’s concept of authenticity renders truth immune from public authentication, so Adorno’s idea of truth cordons truth-authenticating experience off from intersubjective testing” (p.98). Zuidervaart then sets out his own solution through developing a notion of “public authentication” which does justice “to truth itself as a mediated process in which everyone has a stake and outside which no one in contemporary society can flourish” (p.101). This is worked out in terms of a strict correlation between “societal disclosure” which is life giving, and human fidelity to “societal principles such as justice and solidarity” (p.102).<sup>1</sup> In this way truth becomes authenticated when “people bear witness to a correlation between societal disclosure and their fidelity to societal principles” which are worked out in the context of specific cultural practices and social institutions. Zuidervaart emphasizes that while such ‘bearing witness’ involves ‘discursive practices’, such discursive practices always occur within

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<sup>1</sup> In his more recent paper “Unfinished Business: Towards a reformational conception of truth” *Philosophia Reformata* 74:1 2009 p.6 and more extensively in section 3.3 of “After Dooyeweerd: Truth in reformational philosophy” Zuidervaart relates this “strict correlation” to Dooyeweerd’s distinction between the law-side and the subject-side of creation.

multidimensional processes where people “do what truth requires in a social context” and call upon others to respond (p.103).

In the fourth chapter, “Globalizing Dialectic of Enlightenment,” Zuidervaart responds to the criticism of Jürgen Habermas that Adorno expanded “Weber’s rationalization thesis, via Lukacs’s theory of reification, into a totalizing ‘critique of instrumental reason’” (p.111) and so derailed any serious normative critique or empirical investigation through a turn to the aesthetic. This is accomplished through a re-reading of *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, and in particular its theme of the “remembrance of nature” (pp.112–124). He shows that this remembrance is not a purely aesthetic moment but that there is an important role for “the concept” and “unyielding theory” (p.115), and that there can be found in this work three tightly interlinked modes of domination (p.121) that each call for normative critique. Within his discussion of domination Zuidervaart takes up Adorno’s claim, unduly neglected by Habermas, about “the priority of the object”. There are, Adorno argued, “normative limits to the subject’s ability to ‘constitute’ the object” and “the subject itself is an object at its core”. Zuidervaart concurs with this, yet he also adds that missing from both Adorno and Habermas is “any indication that the object can also be a subject” (p.119). This has profound implication for the way we think about how “humans share biospheres with plants and animals” (p.120), but it is possible only when the subject-object relation is no longer thought of in purely epistemological terms. Zuidervaart concludes the chapter with some reflection on the need for a normative critique of capitalism as an economic system, and what “differential transformation” might look like. This second theme draws on the reformational work of Bob Goudzwaard on societal disclosure through “the simultaneous realization of norms” (p.129)

Chapter five returns to issues of autonomy broached in the first chapter, this time in confrontation with feminist cultural politics. Zuidervaart displays obvious sympathy with feminist concerns, but highlights two risks that arise out of current feminist critiques of autonomy. These are that such critiques underplay the distinctive feature of art that make art, *art* and that they have the potential for exposing art to political interference (p.134). In developing his own view of the intersection of culture, politics, and economy (pp.145–154) Zuidervaart makes it clear again that he does not accept a totalizing critique that “portrays many cultural goods as *no more than* hypercommodities” (p.145). It is particularly in the area of voluntary and non-profit associations, as “spaces of resistance” and “new public spheres” which can support “intrinsically worthwhile cultural practices”, where creative and critical dialogue of relevance to feminist struggles for justice and recognition can be fostered.

In the final chapter Zuidervaart reviews where his critical retrieval has arrived by engaging in dialogue with the two divergent “ethical turns” evident in post-Adornian critical theory. The current that Zuidervaart describes as pursuing an “emphatics ethics of the nonidentical”, largely ignores issues of political philosophy and is consequently chided for being “limited in scope”, and inadequate “given both the complexity of contemporary societies and the radicalness of Adorno’s own critique.” (p.158). Zuidervaart, instead, favours a

return to a more Hegelian form of social ethics with its focus on topics such as collectivity and normativity which give a more institutional backing to authentic art practices (pp.161–162). In approaching a social philosophy after Adorno, Zuidervaart wants to combine a normative approach common in the humanities with an interdisciplinary approach attuned to societal structure and historical change more prevalent in the social sciences. Here there is a place for theory in societal transformation in giving a sufficiently comprehensive articulation of human needs and alternative political, economic and cultural arrangements that would promote greater human flourishing.

To conclude this review I raise two issues that deserve further reflection: first the way Zuidervaart theorises societal diversity, and second his account of universal social norms as historical. The first concerns Zuidervaart's tendency to speak of "societal subsystems" (p.128) with its background view of "society as a whole" (pp.135, 136, 162 & 170). While he is careful to state that "individuals do not belong to one subsystem as distinct from another" (p.172), subverting a totalizing relation between individuals, social spheres and society, there remains a danger that the integrity of distinct social spheres cannot be fully defended in the context of a part-whole scheme. This worry is reinforced by the second issue which appears to further undermine the durability of distinct social spheres based on societal norms. An account of universal societal norms that respects human historicity and fallibility, while giving substantive direction, is something of a holy grail in our current pluralistic context. Zuidervaart's developing account should stimulate further reflection in this direction, and we can look forward to future work from him on the related project of a theory of truth.

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